Call-Tracking Data and the Public Health Response to Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax by Mott, Joshua A. et al.
BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
1088 Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002
Call-Tracking Data and the 
Public Health Response to 
Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax
Joshua A. Mott,* Tracee A. Treadwell,* Thomas W. Hennessy,† Paula A. Rosenberg,* 
Mitchell I. Wolfe,* Clive M. Brown,* and Jay C. Butler† 
After public notification of confirmed cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention’s Emergency Operations Center responded to 11,063 bioterrorism-related telephone calls
from October 8 to November 11, 2001. Most calls were inquiries from the public about anthrax vaccines
(58.4%), requests for general information on bioterrorism prevention (14.8%), and use of personal protec-
tive equipment (12.0%); 882 telephone calls (8.0%) were referred to the state liaison team for follow-up
investigation. Of these, 226 (25.6%) included reports of either illness clinically confirmed to be compatible
with anthrax or direct exposure to an environment known to be contaminated with Bacillus anthracis. The
remaining 656 (74.4%) included no confirmed illness but reported exposures to “suspicious” packages or
substances or the receipt of mail through a contaminated facility. Emergency response staff must handle
high call volumes following suspected or actual bioterrorist attacks. Standardized health communication
protocols that address contact with unknown substances, handling of suspicious mail, and clinical evalua-
tion of suspected cases would allow more efficient follow-up investigations of clinically compatible cases in
high-risk groups. 
n response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Cen-
ter and the Pentagon in the United States on September 11,
2001, preestablished emergency operations centers at the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) were activated
to assist in coordinating the public health response. After the
first indication of a case of bioterrorism-related anthrax in
Florida in October (1–4), the volume of calls to the emergency
operations centers from the general public and health depart-
ments increased dramatically. In response to this increased
demand, the preestablished centers were combined into an
agencywide Emergency Operations Center (EOC), specialized
teams were established to focus on specific local investiga-
tions, and staff was supplemented with additional personnel
and resources. 
A triage system was established to monitor incoming calls
for referral to specialized teams (Figure 1). The State Liaison
Team (SLT), which was established as a component of the sec-
ond tier of this system, was formed to respond to calls from
persons reporting illnesses and exposures possibly related to
bioterrorism. The SLT assisted with the diagnostic evaluation
of illness suspected of being due to anthrax exposure by col-
lecting clinical data, providing information, interpreting rec-
ommendations, arranging for diagnostic testing or expert
consultation, and facilitating case reporting with state and
local health authorities. If highly suspicious illnesses war-
ranted further epidemiologic investigations, the SLT assisted
with referrals to field investigation or specialized teams. These
teams then coordinated investigation activities with the appro-
priate state health departments  (Figure 1). 
We describe the nature and volume of telephone calls
received by the EOC, as well as those referred specifically to
the SLT for more detailed tracking and follow-up. We use the
call data to highlight some implications for staffing strategies
and to recommend changes in the EOC triage protocol that
may allow second-tier referral teams to focus more exclusively
on high-risk case investigations. 
Methods
A variety of professional staff screened calls coming into a
central telephone bank. A prerecorded message instructed call-
ers to contact their state or local health department if they had
not done so. Calls that could be answered with “Frequently
Asked Questions” documents or guidelines published in the
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) were han-
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Figure 1. Emergency Operations Center (EOC) telephone call triage
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dled directly by public health advisors, epidemiologists, and
junior staff (5–8). Callers were referred to the SLT for follow-
up if they reported symptoms consistent with anthrax or other
bioterrorism agents, noted exposure to a suspicious package or
substance, or required detailed medical expertise. SLT staff
included a team of public health advisors to obtain initial case
information, and at least two physicians, epidemiologists, or
veterinarians. The SLT had an average of nine staff members
(range 2–15) that was reduced in evenings and on weekends
depending on the volume of calls being received. Whenever
appropriate, calls were also referred from the SLT to state epi-
demiologists for more detailed follow-up.
Two Access databases (Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA)
were created to assist in documenting and tracking all incom-
ing calls. A general database was intended to document every
incoming call to the EOC telephone bank. For all incoming
calls—call volume permitting—central telephone bank staff
were instructed to record information on the date, topic, and
type of caller on call response forms. SLT staff regularly col-
lected these forms for manual data entry. Reports of call vol-
ume, call type, and call topic by day were then shared with
EOC management and communications personnel to assist
them with staffing decisions, publication of MMWR reports,
and determination of educational needs.
Calls referred from the central telephone bank to the SLT
were manually entered into a second, more detailed SLT track-
ing database. Information collected in this tracking database
included demographic background of the patient, reporter
information, and any reported symptoms or exposures. SLT
staff were also asked to assign each referred call to a risk cate-
gory to prioritize follow-up within the large volume of calls.
Telephone call data were exported from Access databases
into Statistical Analysis Software (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary,
NC). Distributions of call volume by date of call, type of
caller, and topic of call were produced from the central EOC
telephone bank data. Descriptive analyses of SLT tracking data
were undertaken by type of caller, state of reported occurrence,
triage classification (level of urgency), reported signs and
symptoms, and nature of reported exposure. Data were ana-
lyzed during the peak period of call volume during the anthrax
investigations (October 8 to November 11, 2001). 
Results
EOC Telephone Bank Data
From October 8 to November 11, 2001, a total of 11,063
telephone calls were documented and responded to by EOC
telephone bank staff. A topic of call was indicated for 4,178
(37.8%) of the calls. The most frequently mentioned topic was
“questions about the availability of an anthrax vaccine” (2,438
[58.4%] of 4,178 calls), followed by “request for general biot-
errorism information” (617 calls [14.8%]), “request for infor-
mation about personal protective equipment” (501 calls
[12.0%]), “general concerns about bioterrorism” (491 calls
[11.8%]), and “request for information about smallpox” (400
calls [9.6%]).1
The type of caller was indicated on 6,845 (61.9%) of the
11,063 call forms. The most frequent types of callers included
private citizens (3,712 [54.2%] of 6,845 calls), followed by
physicians (1,846 calls [27.0%]), other federal or state
employees (714 calls [10.4%]), and nonphysician health-care
professionals (672 calls [9.8%]).1 A greater percentage of calls
from private citizens (42.5%) than from health professionals
(32.1%) mentioned concerns about smallpox, bioterrorism, or
requests for bioterrorism information.  Health professionals
(2.7%) were more likely than private citizens (0.7%) to ask
questions about sample handling and processing.
Call volume increased to a peak of 858 calls received on
October 16, 2001, shortly after the public announcement that a
letter containing anthrax had been opened in Senator Tom
Daschle’s office (Figure 2). After that date, call volume to the
EOC decreased each week. While the highly publicized nature
of the bioterrorism-related events contributed to the large
number of calls received by the EOC, day of the week was
also an important determinant of call volume. Fewer calls
were received on the weekends of October 13–14, 20–21, and
27–28 and November 3–4 and 10–11. During the period of
data collection, the mean call volume to the EOC was 80
incoming calls per day on weekends and 411 incoming calls
per day on weekdays. During weekdays, a lower call volume
was also consistently observed on Mondays and Fridays. An
average of 350 incoming calls per day were received on Mon-
days and Fridays and 450 incoming calls per day during Tues-
day through Thursday. The proportion of calls received by
topic of call and type of caller did not change in any meaning-
ful way during this time (data not shown).
SLT Follow-Up Tracking Data
Of the 11,063 calls received by the EOC telephone bank,
882 (8.0%) were referred to the SLT for follow-up. Calls
referred to the SLT came most commonly from physicians
(256 calls [29.0%]), followed by private citizens (178 calls
[20.1%]); state health department employees (99 calls
[11.2%]); local government, law enforcement, or emergency
personnel (99 calls [11.2%]); and nonphysician health-care
workers (82 calls [9.3%]). The type of caller was not docu-
mented for 168 (19.0%) of the calls referred to the SLT. 
The SLT staff provided follow-up on calls from 48 states,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam. Figure 3
presents the distribution of these calls by state of occurrence.
While the distribution of calls by state was generally popula-
tion based, a larger proportion of calls were received from
states with increased press coverage of confirmed cases of
anthrax and from Georgia, where CDC headquarters is
1Percentages do not add up to 100% as a call could include more than
one topic (e.g., requests for information about more than one topic) or
type of caller (e.g., caller is a physician who works at a state health
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located. Forty-six percent of SLT follow-up activities per-
tained to reported occurrences in Washington, D.C., Georgia,
New York, California, Maryland, and Pennsylvania (Figure 3).
The proportion of calls received from private citizens or physi-
cians did not vary by region of the country (data not shown).
Because SLT staff was limited to an average of nine mem-
bers, a triage protocol to classify calls referred to the SLT by
level of urgency was developed (Table 1). In 10.4% of the
calls referred to the SLT for follow-up, a physician or health-
care professional reported symptoms clinically compatible
with anthrax in a person from a known high-risk group (postal
workers, U.S. government officials, national press from con-
taminated facilities, or person with known contact with a con-
taminated facility) or in a person who reported exposure to a
suspicious substance. An additional 15.2% of calls referred to
the SLT included a report by a health-care professional of a
person with clinically compatible symptoms but no reported
high-risk status or possible source of exposure. Forty-four per-
cent of all calls referred to the SLT mentioned exposure to a
suspicious package or substance but did not include any report
of clinically confirmed signs or symptoms. An additional
30.4% of the calls referred to the SLT included no mention of
any reported exposures, signs, or symptoms (Table 1). 
Of the 181 calls referred to SLT that mentioned signs or
symptoms clinically compatible with anthrax (classified as
level A, B, C, or E in Table 1), fever or influenzalike symp-
toms were most commonly reported (57 calls [31%]). Other
commonly reported signs and symptoms included skin lesions
or eschars (48 calls [26.5%]), upper respiratory symptoms (47
calls [26.0%]), and skin rashes (19 calls [10.5%]). Fewer calls
included mention of sore throats (15 calls [8.3%]), myalgia (15
calls [8.3%]), gastrointestinal problems (8 calls [4.4%]), lym-
phadenopathy (6 calls [3.3%]), chest pain (6 calls [3.3%]), and
shortness of breath (4 calls [2.2%]).1
 Four hundred eighty calls (54.4%) referred to the SLT
included mention of exposure to a suspicious substance or
package or direct contact with an environment known to be
contaminated with B. anthracis (classified as level B, C, D, or F
in Table 1). Over half of reported exposures included mention
of contact with a “suspicious” powder or package (Table 2).
However, <10% of reported exposures (47/480) included men-
tion of any clinically confirmed signs or symptoms compatible
with anthrax. As a result, standardized response protocols to
address the handling of suspicious packages and powders and
the receipt of mail through contaminated facilities were devel-
oped (5,7). This measure allowed second-tier triage staff to
devote more time to calls involving clinically compatible cases
from high-risk groups and SLT medical staff to remain on-call
at off-site locations during evenings and weekends. 
None of the calls referred to the SLT were confirmed to be
reports of cases of anthrax. The confirmed cases of anthrax
were identified by the CDC field specialty teams or through
calls made to the CDC director.
Discussion
From October 8 to November 11, 2001, the EOC received
11,063 telephone calls pertaining to bioterrorism and referred
882 of these calls to the SLT for diagnostic evaluation, consul-
tation, and coordination of follow-up activities. The volume of
calls received during this time period demonstrated a consider-
able public need for guidance during this emergency. 
Highly publicized incidents such as the opening of the let-
ter in Sen. Daschle’s office were likely catalysts for the
observed increases in call volume. However, day-to-day pat-
terns in the call volume to the EOC telephone bank suggest
that at predictable times during the week emergency staff
resources can be relaxed. During the data collection period, the
mean call volume to the EOC was 80% lower on weekends
than on weekdays. Within the working week, mean call vol-
umes were 23% lower on Mondays and Fridays than during
the rest of the work week. As many staff worked 12–20 hour
Figure 2. Telephone calls documented by staff of the Emergency Oper-
ations Center telephone bank, October 8 to November 11, 2001 (n =
11,063 call forms)
Figure 3. Distribution of telephone calls referred to the State Liaison
Team, by state of occurrence, October 8 to November 11, 2001 (n = 882
calls)
1Percentages do not add up to 100% because callers often reported
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days during the height of this emergency, allowing staff to
remain “on-call” at off-site locations on days of predictably
lower call volume may help maintain staff morale and stamina
through long periods of emergency center operations.
The EOC implemented a tiered telephone call triage sys-
tem designed to allow highly suspicious cases and exposures
to be tracked more closely by field epidemiology and specialty
teams (Figure 1). Using scripted responses to frequently asked
questions, this system effectively screened out many calls
involving general queries about anthrax vaccines, requests for
bioterrorism information, and the use of personal protective
equipment. This approach allowed the SLT at the second tier
of the triage system to spend more time interpreting clinically
confirmed symptoms and laboratory results, and monitoring
possible exposures for further referral to appropriate special-
ized teams. 
These findings, however, also indicate that many calls
received by the SLT did not pertain to known high-risk situa-
tions. During the data collection period, nearly 75% of calls
referred to the SLT did not include a report of any clinically
confirmed signs or symptoms or any direct contact with an
environment known to be contaminated with B. anthracis. Of
these calls, nearly 60% mentioned contact with a suspicious
powder or package, but included no report of illness. As a
result, to maintain specificity in tracking high-risk cases,
scripted responses were developed to questions regarding 1)
contact with unknown substances, 2) the receipt of mail
through a facility that had been contaminated with B. anthra-
cis, and 3) the report of clinically unconfirmed signs or symp-
toms (5,7). We recommend further refinement of these
response protocols for inclusion in the first tier of the triage
system, along with additional training of telephone bank staff
in the overall objectives and methods of triage during bioter-
rorism emergencies. These measures would substantially
reduce the call volume burden on second-tier staff and
decrease the chance that a high-risk situation would be over-
looked during a similar bioterrorism event.
State health departments typically expect that CDC will
direct local calls back to them unless they have previously
Table 1. Telephone calls referred to Emergency Operations Center State Liaison Team (SLT), by risk category, October 8 to November 11, 2001
Risk/urgency 
classification 
Criteria Frequency
 (N = 882)
Percent (%) of all 
calls referred to SLT
Level 1:  A      
“Confirmed”
A.  Clinically compatiblea case -and- 
B.   Isolation of Bacillus anthracis or two supportive lab results. 
0b 0.0
B   A.  Clinically compatible case -and-
B.  No isolation of B. anthracis, but one supportive lab result -or-epidemiologic link to confirmed 
     exposure but no supportive lab results 
20 . 2
C A.  Clinically compatible case –and-
B.   No epidemiologic link and no lab results -and-
C.   Known high-risk group: postal worker, U.S. government official, national press from contaminated
       facilities/or person with known contact with a contaminated facility -or-Ingestion of, inhalation of, or
      dermal contact with suspicious substance
45 5.1
D  A.   No illness (or reports of symptoms that are clinically unconfirmed by a health professional) -and-
B.   Known direct exposure to environment confirmed to be contaminated with B. anthracis 
45 5.1
E A.   Clinically compatible case –and-
B.   Not in high-risk group, -and-
C.   No lab results or epidemiologic link, -and-
D.   No known exposures to suspicious substance or packages 
134 15.2
F A.   No illness (or reports of symptoms that are clinically unconfirmed by a health professional) -and-
B.   Not in high-risk group, -and-
C.   No lab results or epidemiologic link, -and-
D.   Ingestion of, inhalation of, or dermal contact with suspicious substance, or received mail directly
      from facility known to be contaminated during period of investigation.
388 44.0
G A.   No illness (or reports of symptoms that are clinically unconfirmed by a health professional) -and-
B.   Not in high-risk group, -and-
C.   No lab results or epidemiologic link, -and-
D.   No known exposure to suspicious powder or packages.  
247 28.0
Unknown/
not classified
A.   Unknown or call not related to anthrax 21 2.4
aClinically compatible refers to physician or health professional report of any symptom thought to be related to inhalational, cutaneous, or gastrointestinal anthrax.
bCases of anthrax confirmed during this time period were identified through active surveillance by CDC field epidemiology teams and not the Emergency Operations Center telephone 
bank.
Table 2. Nature of reported exposure reported in telephone calls 
referred to the State Liaison Team, October 8 to November 11, 2001
Reported exposure No. Percent (%)
Received letter or package with suspicious powder 181 37.7
Visited location where Bacillus anthracis was isolated 102 21.3
Unspecified exposure to suspicious powder 81 16.9
Received mail from mail facility where B. anthracis 
was isolated
57 11.9
Received suspicious package without powder 20 4.2
Other 38 7.9
Unknown 1 0.1
Total 480a 100
a480 calls included a report of exposure.BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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been referred to CDC (9). As more than half the calls to the
EOC were from private citizens, a larger number of calls
should also have been redirected from the EOC to appropriate
contact persons at the state level (with minimal data entry and
analysis by CDC). Such referrals would have allowed the EOC
staff more time to respond to questions from physicians or
health departments. The extent to which state and local health
departments were satisfied with the assistance received from
the EOC also remains unknown. A survey of state and local
personnel who contacted the EOC system would assist CDC
staff with quality improvement of the triage system and pro-
vide additional insight into the state perspective of appropriate
respective roles during periods of emergency response.
These data have several limitations. An unknown number
of calls to the EOC telephone bank were undocumented as
first-tier staff were unable to complete all telephone call
response forms during peak periods of call intensity. These
high call volumes periodically resulted in delays in informa-
tion transfer between tiers of the telephone call triaging sys-
tem. In addition, the manual completion of telephone response
forms resulted in a substantial amount of missing data, as first
and second-tier EOC staff often overlooked key data elements
in their efforts to provide timely responses to public demands.
Several coding classification schemes on the telephone
response forms also require revision. For example, we were
unable retrospectively to determine the number of law
enforcement or emergency medical service personnel who
called the central phone bank or whether callers from state
health departments were medical or public relations personnel.
Telephone-based hotlines underestimate the true number
of cases of a disease and are dependent on media reports and
general public interest (10).  However, a telephone bank at
CDC during an outbreak of hantavirus pulmonary syndrome
identified 38% of confirmed cases (10).  Computerization of
the EOC triage system, including required fields for date and
topic of call and type of caller would allow for timely transfer
and analysis of complete and accurate telephone call data and
perhaps provide a similar layer of passive surveillance for
emerging bioterrorism events. However, the maintenance of
such a system would require additional technical expertise in
database development, management, and analysis (11). Medi-
cal expertise in first-tier telephone bank staff will continue to
be needed to assure the accurate entry of data into any auto-
mated system.
Our findings suggest that available on-site staff resources
can be adjusted to predictable daily patterns of call volume to
increase long-term effectiveness and stamina during emer-
gency periods. While the first tier of the EOC telephone call
triage system effectively addressed a substantial portion of all
incoming public inquiries during this emergency, standardized
health communication protocols that address contact with sus-
picious substances, handling of suspicious mail, and the clini-
cal evaluation of suspected cases in the absence and presence
of confirmed exposure should also be added to first-tier
response activities in a computerized triage system. This stan-
dardization would allow for a more effective triage system for
inquiries and more efficient focus for follow-up investigations
by specialized epidemiologic teams. 
Acknowledgments
We thank the following persons for their assistance in triage clas-
sification, data management and entry, and data analyses activities:
Karen Addison, Veronica Alvarez, C.J. Alverson, Sue Baldwin, Joe
Bresee, Bob Breuer, Michelle Collins, Norm Fikes, Prethibha George,
William “Bill” Greim, Cassaundra Hayes, Alma Head, Wes Hodgson,
Mark Keim, Neetu Khurana, Mary Lerchen, Sherry Lomax, John
Loonsk, Eric Mast, Jennifer McQuiston, Nada Mishrik, Scott
McCombs, Donald Mixon, Carlos Quintanilla, Laura Seeff, David
Swerdlow, Teresa Wallace, and Theressa Wingfield.
Dr. Mott is an epidemiologist in the Air Pollution and Respiratory
Health Branch, National Center for Environmental Health, CDC. His
current areas of focus include surveillance and prevention of carbon
monoxide poisoning, validation of a biological marker of forest fire
smoke exposure, and epidemiology of asthma.
References
  1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Notice to readers: ongoing
investigation of anthrax—Florida, October 2001. MMWR Morb Mortal
Wkly Rep 2001;50:877. 
  2. Jernigan JA, Stephens DS, Ashford DA, Omenaca C, Topiel MS, Gal-
braith M, et al. Bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax: the first 10
cases reported in the United States. Emerg Infect Dis 2001;7:933–44. 
  3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Bioterrorism-related anthrax,
2001. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2001;50:1008–10. 
  4. Bush LM, Abrams BH, Beall A, Johnson CC. Index case of fatal inhala-
tional anthrax due to bioterrorism in the United States. N Engl J Med
2001;345:1607–10.
  5. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. CDC website: anthrax infor-
mation. Accessed 4/24/2001. Available from: URL: http://
www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Anthrax/AnthraxGen.asp
  6. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Update: investigation of bio-
terrorism-related anthrax and adverse events from antimicrobial prophy-
laxis. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2001;50:973–6.
  7. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Update: investigation of bio-
terrorism-related anthrax and interim guidelines for exposure manage-
ment and antimicrobial therapy. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
2001;50:909–19. 
  8. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Update: investigation of bio-
terrorism-related anthrax and interim guidelines for clinical evaluation of
persons with possible anthrax. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
2001;50:941–8.
    9. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Website: Interim recom-
mended notification procedures for local and state public health depart-
ment leaders in the event of a bioterrorist incident. Accessed 7/14/2002.
Available from: URL:  http://www.bt.cdc.gov/emcontact/protocols.asp 
10. Tappero JW, Khan AS, Pinner RW, Wenger JD, Graber JM, Armstrong
LR, et al. Utility of emergency, telephone-based national surveillance for
hantavirus pulmonary syndrome. JAMA 1996;275:398–400.
11. Stark C, Christie P, Marr AC. How to do it: Run an emergency hotline.
BMJ 1994;  309:44–5.
Address for correspondence: Joshua Mott, Air Pollution and Respiratory
Health Branch, National Center for Environmental Health, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, Mailstop E17, Atlanta, GA
30333, USA; fax: 404-498-1088; e-mail: zud9@cdc.gov